Although Egypt has persistently argued that the 1959 agreement between Egypt and Sudan is the legal framework for the allocation of the waters of the Nile, Ethiopia and other upstream riparian states reject that argument. Since 2015, technical reports on the potential impacts of the dam have failed to reach a consensus within the TNC (Maguid, 2017). Ethiopia has the basins most suitable locations for hydropower production, and its damming of the Blue Nile would significantly increase Sudan's potential for irrigated agriculture. The strategy and its surrounding narrative have attracted large influxes of foreign investment in the Ethiopian agrarian sector, with multi-million dollar leases of agricultural land to foreigners generally linked to irrigation projects planned in tandem with the construction of the dam. The disadvantages for Egypt and Sudan are the possibility of reduced river flow, although this is only really a problem during the years of filling the dam. Also, the Sudanese Foreign Ministry later held the Egyptian side accountable for failure of these negotiations. Sudan and Egypt, which rely most heavily on the . In the relatively unlikely scenario that the above points failed, Ethiopia could argue that there has been such a change of circumstances since the Nile Waters Treaties were concluded that they ought to be terminated. Practically from the outset, the World Bank and international donors withdrew funding due to a lack of transparency, driven home when it was learned that the construction had begun without a permit from the Environmental Protection Agency in Ethiopia. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam will have negative impacts not only on Egypt but also on poor communities in Ethiopia as well as on its Nile Basin neighbours Ethiopia's strategy for dam construction goes far beyond developmental goals. Four of these would potentially be located on the main river and one would eventually evolve into the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). What could have been strictly technical negotiations have turned into a political deadlock. IDS (2013). Third, Egypt should abandon continued references to its so-called natural historical rights (i.e., the water rights granted Egypt by the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the 1959 Agreement between Egypt and Sudan). For a decade, Egypt and Ethiopia have been at a diplomatic stalemate over the Nile's management. In the end, all 11 riparian states must understand that the way forward calls for the establishment of a meaningful resource-sharing agreement, one that sees and recognizes the Nile River as a regional watercourse. In contrast, if water from the Dam were to be used for irrigation purposes by Ethiopia (i.e. The first filling of the dam in July 2020 went uneventfully. Ethiopia, however, prefers to have the flexibility to make decisions on how to deal with droughts. Tawfik, Rawia Discussion Paper 5/2015 . Search for jobs related to Disadvantages of the grand ethiopian renaissance dam or hire on the world's largest freelancing marketplace with 20m+ jobs. for seepage and evaporation, but afforded no water to Ethiopia or other upstream riparian statesthe sources of most of the water that flows into the Nile. There are suggestions that Egyptian officials in the World Bank managed to precipitate a policy that funds would only be awarded for non-contentious water projects, thus precluding funding for the Dam. However, this threatens the basin's long-term sustainability (as water use expands beyond what is environmentally feasible) and suboptimal in terms of capital allocation (as higher water use upstream may make downstream projects uneconomical (Swain, 2011). Cairo Controversy prevailed in the Egyptian public opinion, after Deltares, a Dutch advisory institute, announced on Sept. 15 its withdrawal from a study to assess the risks that the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which is under construction on the Blue Nile, can cause to Egypt and Sudan. Therefore, all the water is eventually released downstream with the effect that there is no net loss of water to downstream states. The dispute escalated in 2011 when Ethiopia began construction of a major new dam, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), in the absence of any agreement with downstream Egypt. However, Sudans future water requirements will likely exceed its water quota as defined in the 1959 Agreement. His successor, Mohamed Morsi, said that Egypt was prepared to defend each drop of Nile water with blood. An armed conflict has not emerged, but there are suggestions that Egyptian intelligence services undermined Ethiopia internally by assisting the Oromo Liberation Front in its campaign of civil unrest in Ethiopia in 2016. This is a matter of acute concern given that Egypt depends on the Nile for about 97% of its irrigation and drinking water. Egypt has issued a public statement to that effect. Ethiopia Needs the United States to Act as an Honest Broker in the Nile . The Eastern Nile Basin is of critical geopolitical importance to the Niles overall hydro-political regime. The multi-services provided by the hydropower development and its technical advantages could be driving forces for local, regional and national development, and a catalyst for sustainable development. However, it also entails potential negative effects on Egypt, if not carefully managed (see alsoSecurity implications of growing water scarcity in Egypt). While the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is taking shape on . These run from rising rivalry between Egypt and Ethiopia to a festering border war between Ethiopia and neighboring Sudan. First came the 1999 Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA). Nile Basins GERD dispute creates risks for Egypt, Sudan, and beyond. when did construction of the dam begin? On 5 July 2021, Ethiopia informed Egypt and Sudan that the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile in Ethiopia is undergoing its second filling. The late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who laid the foundation stone in 2011, said the dam would be built without begging for money . Hydrological Sciences Journal, 56(4), 687-702. For nearly a century, as a legacy of colonialism, Egypt enjoyed what Tekuya referred to as a hydro-hegemony over the Nile; despite Ethiopia contributing 86% to its waters. Even without taking the dam into account, the largely desert country is short of water. Because the strategy of land allocation and dam construction relied on senior executive decisions and foreign funding from China, above all, the government was largely freed of pressures of transparency and accountability. Ethiopia argues that developing this resource is crucial to its economic development, and to overcoming poverty and famine, that have plagued the country in the past. Workers move iron girders from a crane at the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), near Guba, Ethiopia, on Dec. 26, 2019. It also codified the principles of equitable and reasonable utilisation and no significant harm (essentially importing from the Watercourses Convention). This is hardly a revelation, as this strategy has long been foremost in the minds of the ruling elites in Addis Ababa and supported by the international powers. Finally, Ethiopia could make a strong case that the operation of the Dam is in alignment with the core principles of international water law, namely equitable utilisation and no significant harm. These are found in Articles 5 and 7 of the Water Courses Convention respectively and, despite the scepticism outlined above, arguably form part of customary international law. First, Ethiopia could highlight that it was not a party to either the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty or the 1959 Egypt-Sudan Treaty. In particular, the DoP takes a very strict approach to the no significant harm rule. Stratfor Worldview. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and hydroelectric project is located 700 km northeast of the capital city Addis Abeba, in the Benishangul--Gumaz region of Ethiopia, along the Blue Nile River. These countries should return to the NBIs Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), which was concluded in 2010, try to resolve the disagreements that caused Egypt and Sudan to decline to sign the CFA, and use it as a model for a future binding legal regime. The US has revived diplomatic efforts to resolve the dispute sparked by Ethiopia's Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) project on the Nile. Sudan, caught between the competing interests of both Egypt and Ethiopia, has been changing its stance on the issue. The Watercourses Convention aims to regulate the uses, as well as the conservation, of all transboundary waters above and below the surface. Amazingly, the normally required social and environmental impact studies were only conducted three years after construction of the dam had began. This antipathy is not new, with Munzinger noting even in the nineteenth century that Ethiopia is a danger for Egypt [which] must either take over Ethiopia and Islamize it or, retain it in anarchy and misery. Still, the Dam brings the old enmity into sharp focus. In any event, the dispute remains. Already, on June 19, 2020, Egyptian authorities called upon the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to intervene after tripartite talks had failed to secure an agreement on the filling schedule for the GERD. Here, for the first time, Egypt recognised Ethiopias right to use the Nile for development purposes. "Today as you see behind me . Moreover, after the completion of the GERD, Egypt could run short of water if the operation of the GERD was not carefully coordinated with that of the AHD. "I came to Cairo on my first official trip to the region to hear . It merely provides at Article III that Ethiopia undertakes not to construct any work across the Blue Nile, Lake Tsana, or the Sobat which would arrest the flow of their waters into the Nile. In other words, Ethiopia only agreed that it would not completely stop the flow of tributaries into the Nile. In the modern era, the US used water to blackmail Egypt. The so-called Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (Gerd) is Africa's biggest hydroelectric project to date. In response, Ethiopia threatened military force to defend the dam and protect its interests (The New Arab, 2020a). A significant segment of local opinion is also aware of the well-known problems that come with mega-dams wherever they are built, among them population displacements and resettlement, reductions in the quality of life, the spread of waterborne diseases, salinisation and the loss of productive and profitable lands, more intense competition over the remaining available land, and losses of cultural and historic heritage. Since its inception, there have been two, highly contentious, products. But the project has caused concern. Most recently, there have been suggestions that the African Union should resolve the disagreement. In turn, Egypt water policy and management should be changes or modified to overcome the great challenges. This is because it is traditionally understood to refer to waterways that form intrinsic parts of international boundaries. It imports about half its food products and recycles about 25 bcm of water annually. While such dams also come with long-term benefits to local populations, the chief beneficiary will always be the state, which reaps profits from the sale of surplus electricity. Second, regarding the 1902 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty, although Ethiopia was a party and although that instrument does deal with the flow of water on the Nile, its terms are strictly limited. It is therefore intrinsically connected with the question of land ownership. Egypt had asked the UNSC to push the three countries to adhere to their obligations in accordance with the rules of international law in order to reach a fair and balanced solution to the issue of the GERD. Egypts repeated references to the rules of international law is part of an effort to maintain its so-called natural and historical rights that were established and reaffirmed by the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and 1959 Agreement between Egypt and Sudan, respectivelytreaties many of the other involved parties reject as anachronistic and untenable. Ethiopia and Sudan are currently developing and implementing water infrastructure developments unilaterally - as Egypt has done in the past and continues to do. The 1959 agreement allocated all the Nile Rivers waters to Egypt and Sudan, leaving 10 billion cubic meters (b.c.m.) But this did not rule out eruptions of tension, not just between local communities and the central government, but also between Ethiopia and its neighbours. Subsequent impact studies were performed by the European Investment Bank and the African Development Bank, and in the light of the results, these banks cancelled their funding for Gibe III. The Friends of Lake Turkana, an NGO representing indigenous groups whose livelihoods are dependent on the Lake, filed a suit to halt the construction of the dam. Despite several tripartite meetings between November 2013 and January 2014, no agreement was reached on the implementation of the IPoE recommendations and controversies were evolving around the constitution of a trilateral committee. One senior advisor to former Ethiopian prime minister Meles Zenawi alluded to it when he said that Ethiopia will supply the electricity, Sudan the food, and Egypt the money. To which we might add, and South Sudan will supply the oil.. The toll on the local communities affected by the dams has been enormous. This crisis has raised great concerns among large sectors of the Egyptian society, especially in light of recalling such statements as "water war," "water militarization," "military management of the GERD crisis," "water terrorism," and "Ethiopian hydro-hegemony over the Nile Basin" [ 1, 2 ]. The announcement on Friday comes a day after Ethiopia said it had launched power production from the second turbine at the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Ethiopian Yearbook of International Law 2017. The official narrative is that Ethiopia can uproot poverty and bring about a definitive end to social and economic underdevelopment by means of the construction of a series of mega-dams combined with the development of the national energy infrastructure. The crucial leverage regarding Egypts water security lies with the Blue Nile countries Ethiopia and Sudan, as the Blue Nile is the main contributor to the Nile Rivers flow downstream. The Chinese-financed Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), despite a recent breakdown in talks on Africa's largest development project, risks powering up a range of downstream tensions and rivalries. In the absence of the application of the Watercourses Convention, various other legal arrangements and political declarations must be considered to gain an understanding of the regulation of the Dam and the Nile River more generally. (eds.). Article IV of the DoP provides that the parties shall utilize their shared water resources in their respective territories in an equitable and reasonable manner and Article III provides that the parties shall take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm in utilizing the Blue/Main Nile. Ethiopia can make a strong case that the operation of the Dam complies with each principle. For Ethiopia, GERD is considered an economic game-changer. It seeks to build an infrastructure for regional water hegemony, positioning it, at the very least, in such a way that it can exchange water for oil. It's free to sign up and bid on jobs. February 14, 2022 JPEG It too has legal arguments it could adduce in support of its position that the Dam is permitted under international law. A political requirement will be to agree on rules for filling the GERD reservoir and on operating rules for the GERD, especially during periods of drought. [35] The lack of international financing for projects on the Blue Nile River has persistently been attributed to Egypt's campaign to keep control on the Nile water share. Helping Egypts cause, during the preparation of the VCSS, the International Law Commission stated that treaties concerning water rights or navigation on rivers are commonly regarded as candidates for inclusion in the category of territorial treaties. However, it must be noted that this would represent a generous interpretation of the territorial treaty exception. When it is completed, with its concrete volume of 10.2 million m3, GERD will feature the largest dam in Africa. Afraid that a drought might appear during the filling period, Egypt wants the filling to take place over a much longer period. The situation seemed to improve in the beginning of 2015 when tripartite negotiations were held in order to determine principles of cooperation. All three countries have a vested interest in a properly operated dam. l located on the Blue Nile River in Ethiopia . Such an understanding and appreciation of Egypts water vulnerability would help the riparians develop a water management protocol that can significantly enhance equitable and reasonable use while minimizing significant harm to downstream riparians. Some have mythified it and claim it is the Gihon River of the Biblical Book of Genesis that encircles the entire land of Cush, thereby adding a religious dimension to the politicisation. Alaa al-Zawahiri, a member of the Egyptian National Panel of Experts studying the effects of the Renaissance Dam, believes as much. This exception was implemented to mitigate the risk of decolonisation leading to boundary wars. According to some estimates, the Ethiopian government had to arrange for the resettlement of 1.5 million people in the four regions of Gambela, Somali, Afar, and Benishangul-Gumuz. Second, as also noted above, the Dam is to be used for electricity generation, not irrigation. It's very unpredictable and it can be very dangerous," says Pottinger. After announcing the dam's construction, and with a view to the increasing tensions, the Ethiopian government invited both Egypt and Sudan to form an International Panel of Experts (IPoE) to solicit understanding of the benefits, costs and impacts of the GERD. While the water will return to its normal state before reaching Egypt, the damage to these populations will be permanent. Water Policy, 16(4), 595-608. per year, that would constitute a drought and, according to Egypt and Sudan, Ethiopia would have to release some of the water in the dams reservoir to deal with the drought. Gebreluel, G. (2014). - Ethiopia's massive. No water at all was allocated to Ethiopia. . Lastly, over-year storage facilities upstream in Ethiopia will allow Sudan to increase its water use. Monday January 2, 2017. Kandeel, A. This represents a new challenge to the basins current hydro-political regime and status quo, as it may drive Sudans interest in renegotiating its current quota(Link et al., 2012;Whittington et al., 2014). The International Court of Justice (ICJ) takes an expansionist view towards decolonisation as seen in the Chagos Islands Advisory Opinion, in which it allowed the decolonisation agenda to trump the UKs lack of consent to any contentious proceedings.